Mitchell D. Henderson v. For Shor Company : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
Mitchell D. Henderson v. For Shor Company : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James C. Jenkins; JENKINS & ASSOCIATES.
J. Blaine Zollinger; ZOLLINGER & ATTWOOD.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation







>OCKE-LN£L. <270SG> -C/t E »:Ol.'R " OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MITCHELL D. HENDERSON. 
ILEEN BUTTARS, LAUREMA B. 
HENDERSON, and DAVID HALE 




C?i/ <*x-( h 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT FOR-SHOR COMPANY 
Aooe3 l from t h e J u d g m e n t and D e c l i s i o n o f t h e 
JUCICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The H o n o r a b l e VeNoy " h r i s t o f f e r se jn , P r e s i d i n g 
J . B l a i n e Z o l l i n g e r 
ZOLLINGER & ATTWOOf' 
256 N o r t h F i r s t W y 
Loo a n , U tah 84321 
T e t e o h o n ? - C8™ ^ 
James '• J e n k i n s 
JAMES C. .JENKINS & ASSOCIATES 
67 Easr. I'-O Nor:;n 
P . O . Box 3 7('0 
L o g a n , Utah 84321 
T e l e p h o n e •-••)' " 5 2 - 4 1 0 7 
AI-1:11 r n r.- j I De I end an L / A p - • L e 11 an t 
A : to rn>-v f< !..-•! i •" i 11 s / ;\<.- s pond en t s 
JUL311 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STAT|E OF UTAH 
MITCHELL D. HENDERSON, 
ILEEN BUTTARS, LAURENA B. 
HENDERSON,and DAVID HALE 
P l a i n t i f f s / R e s p o n d e n t s 
vs . 
FOR-SHOR COMPANY 
Defend a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
BRIEjF OF APPELLANT 
Suprieme Cour t No. 20626 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT FOR-SHOR COMPANY 
Appeal from t h e Judgment and D e c i s i o n of t h e 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The Honorable VeNoy C h r i s t o f f e r s e n , P r e s i d i n g 
J . B l a i n e Z o l l i n g e r 
ZOLLINGER & ATTWOOD 
256 North F i r s t West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Te l ephone : (801) 752-0012 
James C. J e n k i n s 
JAMES C. JENKINS & ASSOCIATES 
67 Eas t | 0 0 North 
P .O. Box 3700 
Logan, Utah 84321 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 752-4107 
A t t o r n e y fo r D e f e n d a n t / A p p l e l l a n t 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f s / R e s p o n d e n t s 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
NATURE OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 13 
I . FOR-SHOR'S REPOSSESSION OF THE FORMS WAS LAWFUL . . 1 5 
BECAUSE THE MISREPRESENTATION OF HENDERSON VOIDED 
THE PROMISSORY NOTE GIVEN TO FOR-SHOR, AND PURSUANT 
TO THE TITLE RETENTION AGREEMENT HELD BY FOR-SHOR, 
TITLE TO THE FORMS RENTED BY MITCHELL HENDERSON DID 
NOT PASS TO MITCHELL HENDERSON. 
I I . THERE WAS NO BONI FIED SALE OF THE FORMS FROM . . .22 
HENDERSON TO BUTTARS. FOR-SHORS SECURITY INTEREST 
REMAINED INVALID AND INTACT UP TO AND INCLUDING 
THE DATE OF REPOSSESSION 
I I I . THE COURT CANNOT AWARD DAMAGES TO ANY PARTY FOR 
ITEMS WHICH WERE NOT PLEAD BY THAtT PARTY OR 
RAISED BY THAT PARTY PRTOR TO TRML 
30 
IV. THE CLAIM FOR LOSS OF PROFITS AND RENTALS IS . . .32 
TOTALLY SPECULATIVE AND SHOULD NOf HAVE BEEN 
AWARDED 
V. PLAINTIFFS OFFERED NO EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE . .36 
VALUE OF THE FORMS REPOSSESSED BY FOR-SHOR AT 
THE TIME OF THE REPOSSESSION AND NO VALUE SHOULD 
BE AWARDED 
VI. PLAINTIFFS DID 
BY ANY ALLEGED 
PROPERTY 
NOT ESTABLISH ANY DAMAGES CAUSED . .40 
TRESPASS ON LAURENA HENDERSONS 
CONCLUSION 41 
ADDENDUM 43 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES: 
S e c t i o n 70A-9-102 ( 2 ) , Utah Uniform Commercilal Code 
S e c t i o n 70A-9-201 , Utah Uniform Commercial C|ode 
S e c t i o n 70A-9-306 ( 2 ) , Utah Uniform Commercilal Code 
TREATISES: 
Blacks Law dictionary, 
White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 151 
75 ALR 3d 1061 
75 Am Jur 2d, Tresspass, Section 49. 
CASE LAW: 
Acculog Inc v. Petersen, 
692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984) Supreme Court No. 18133. 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 
590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) 
Bunnell v. Bills, 
368 P.2d 597, 13 Utah 2d 83 (1962) 
Cornia v. Cornia 
546 P.2d 890 (Utah 1976) 
Heaston v. Martinez 
2~82 P.2d 833, 3 Utah 2d 259 (1955) 
Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
683 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1"9~8~4) 
Howarth v. Ostergaard 
515 P. 2d 442, 30 Utah 2d 183 (1973) 
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Co., 
559 P.2d, 958 (Utah 1977) 
Panhandle Pipe and Supply Co. v. S.W. Pressey and Son, 
2~53~PTidT 75T (Col 195TJ 
Pehrson v. Saderup, 
4~98~F.2d 648, 28 Utah 2d 183 (1973) 
Richardson v. Seattle - First Nat. Bank, 
UTT.Td, 341 (Wash7"-TOO 
South Seattle auto Auction, Inc. v. Ladd, 
370 P.2d,~F3U (Or. 1962) 
Tanner v. District Judges, 
UtIE, 649 P.2d S Yl982) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MITCHELL D. HENDERSON, 
ILEEN BUTTARS, LAURENA B. BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
HENDERSON,and DAVID HALE 
P l a i n t i f f / R e s p o n d e n t s 
vs . 
FOR-SHOR COMPANY Supreme Cour t No. 20626 
D e f e n d a n t s / A p p e l l a n t 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The f o H o w i r i R a r e t h p i s s u e s D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t h e r e b y 
p r e s e n t s to t h e c o u r t on a p p e a l : 
1. Ri ghf t o r e p o s s e s s . Was t h e r e p o s s e s s i o n of t he forms 
by F o r - S h o r l a w f u l and d i d F o r - S h o r h a v e a r i g h t t o r e p o s s e s s t h e 
forms p u r s u a n t to t he t i t l e r e t e n t i o n ag reement as s t a t e d on the 
i n v o i c e s s igned by Henderson? Was t h e P r o m i s s o r y Note a v a l i d 
n o t e , and i f so was i t s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e f i n a l p a y m e n t in 
o r d e r to t r a n s f e r t i t l e in t h e equ ipment to Henderson? 
2* ^aT e of t h e forms t o T1 een B u t t a r s ajs £ "bona f i d e 
p u r c h a s e r " . Was t h e s a l e of t h e equ ipment from M i t c h e l l Henderson 
to h i s g r a n d m o t h e r , I I een B u t t a r s , a v a l i d sa| le? I s I l e e n 
B u t t a r s a bona f i d e p u r c h a s e r fo r v a l u e , a s a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t s 9 
3. Damages awarded t o P I a i n t i f f Ha l e . Did the T r i a l Cour t 
e r r in awa rd ing damages to David Hale when th|e damages were n o t 
p l ead in the Compla in t n o r proven a t t r i a l ? 
4. Dsmage for loss of r en ta l . Did the Trial Court err in 
awarding damages to Ileen Buttars for loss of ren ta l s for three 
years when no evidence was presented at t r i a l to es tabl ish the 
ren ta l s and, as future anticipated p ro f i t s , the ren ta ls were 
speculat ive ? 
5. Value of forms* Did the Trial Court err in awarding 
damages to II een But ta r s for the value of the forms when no 
evidence of value was presented at t r i a l ? 
6. Damage f o r t r e s p a s s . Did t h e T r i a l Cour t e r r in 
award ing damages ^o Laurena Henderson fo r t r e s p a s s when no 
damages were shown a t t r i a l 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
N a t u r e of t h e Case 
Th i s a c t i o n was o r i g i n a l l y b r o u g h t by P l a i n t i f f s in an 
a t t e m p t to r e c o v e r fo r damages a l l e g e d to have been caused by 
Defendant /Appel1 a n t , Fo r -Shor Company's a l l e g e d wrongful 
r e p o s s e s s i o n of cement forms used to form f o u n d a t i o n s , r e t a i n i n g 
w a l l s , p t c . Defpndant c l a i m s t h a t t he forms were p r o p e r l y 
r e p o s s e s s e d under a t i t l e r e t e n t i o n ag reement which had been 
s igned by P l a i n t i f f M i t c h e l l D. Henderson . P l a i n t i f f s c l a i m t h a t 
t i t l e to t h e equ ipment passed to M i t c h e l l Henderson upon h i s 
s i g n i n g a p r o m i s s o r y n o t e o r in the a l t e r n a t i v e when F o r - S h o r 
Company o b t a i n e d a d e f a u l t judgment a g a i n s t Henderson on i t s 
Compla in t f o l l o w i n g Hender son ' s d e f a u l t in payments on the n o t e . 
Defendant c l a i m s t h a t t h e n o t e was v o i d a b l e and a c c e p t e d o n l y in 
r e l i a n c e on m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s by M i t c h e l l Henderson t h a t the 
For-Shor forms had been s to len and t h a t therje was no a v a i l a b l e 
c o l l a t e r a l . P l a i n t i f f s f u r the r claim t h a t Henderson sold the 
forms to h i s grandmother, Tleen B u t t a r s , and tha t Mrs. But ta rs 
was in t he p r o c e s s of s e l l i n g the forms to Dfrvid Hale when t h e 
"Forms were repossed by For-Shor Company. 
Dispos j t ion in Lower Court 
The T r i a l Court by Memorandum Decision ( D i s t r i c t Court 
Record pp. 381- 382) ru led t ha t For-Shor Comlpany had no r i g h t to 
reposses the forms holding t ha t the forms h^d been purchased by 
Mr. Henderson, the l a s t payment being in the form of the 
promissory note accepted by For-Shor Company and l a t e r reduced to 
judgment bv For-Shor. 
The Court ru l ed t h a t the s a l e of t he fo fns from Henderson to 
But ta rs was a v a l i d sa le and t h a t , therefore, , Mrs. But ta rs was 
damaged by the taking of t-he forms by For-Shor. The court 
g r a n t e d judgment to Mrs. B u t t a r s for the faijr marke t v a l u e of t he 
forms in the amount $5,725.35 and for a r e n t a l value of the forms 
of $2,500.00 per year for the th ree years frpm July 1981 to Ju ly 
1984. The Court a l so entered judgment in fa|vor of P l a i n t i f f 
David Hale for an overcharge claimed by Hale from For-Shor for 
$265.00 and -judgment was granted to P l a i n t i f f Laurena Henderson 
for t r e s p a s s and damages in the amount of $[100.00. 
The Court fu r ther ruled t ha t Defendant did not i n t e r f e r e 
with the bus iness r e l a t i o n s h i p s between Davi|d Hale and Mi tche l l 
Henderson or IIeen B u t t a r s , t h a t Defendant's r epossess ion was not 
the cause of any mental or emotional d i s t r e s s claimed by Mi tche l l 
Hpnderson and ruled tha t the repossess ion o|f the forms by For-
Shor was not with w i l l f u l or mal ic ious i n t e n t , r e fus ing to award 
p u n i t i v e damages as requested by P l a i n t i f f s . 
Statement of Fac ts 
Mi tche l l Henderson t e s t i f i e d tha t he was a l i censed 
c o n t r a c t o r and had obtained h i s l i c e n s e in 1976, (TVI p. 161, 1. 
21-25) and had no p r i o r management exper ience . ("TVI, p. 59, 1. 8-
13) In September of 1976, P l a i n t i f f , Mi t che l l Henderson s t a r t e d 
M s own cement forming bus iness and in fur therance thereof 
purchased two d i f f e r e n t brands of forms from a company known as 
I n t e r s t a t e I n d u s t r i e s . One se t of forms being the Wallmaster 
brand and the o ther se t being the Mod-u-form brand. 
Coinc ident ly , the Mod-u-form forms had been acquired by 
I n t e r s t a t e I n d u s t r i e s from Defendant in order to f i l l P l a i n t i f f 
Hende r son ' s o r d e r . (TVI p . 17, 1. 3-4; TVI, p . 63, 1. 20 - - p . 
64, 1. 10; Ex. 18) The t r i a l evidence c l e a r l y showed t h a t 
P l a i n t i f f Henderson borrowed approximately $30,000.00 in the f a l l 
of 1976 from F i r s t Secur i ty Bank of Smi thf ie ld to purchase both 
the Wallmaster and For-Shor forms from I n t e r s t a t e I n d u s t r i e s , and 
t h a t F i r s t Secur i ty Bank took a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t in a l l those 
fo rms . ("TVI p . 17, 1. 3 -5 ; Ex. 1.) 
During 1976 to 1978 Mi tche l l Henderson made purchases of 
c e r t a i n supp l ies and rented add i t iona l and sepera te Mod-u-form 
concre te forming equipment d i r e c t l y from Defendant, For-Shor 
Company. As acknow1eded in P l a i n t i f f ' s T r i a l Brief, the Mod-u-
form forms rented by P l a i n t i f f Henderson were in essence 
i d e n t i c a l in type and general appearance to the Mod-u-form forms 
he had p rev ious ly purchased from I n t e r s t a t e I n d u s t r i e s and 
pledged as security to First Security Bank of Smithfield. (DCR p. 
315) 
In October of 1976, P l a i n t i f f Mi tche l l Henderson opened an 
account for r e n t a l and purchase of goods ancf m a t e r i a l s from 
Defendant For-Shor company and entered into an account agreement 
o u t l i n i n g the terms and prov is ions for such r e l a t i o n s h i p . (Ex. 
17) Of p a r t i c u l a r importance are paragraphs 1 and 2. Paragraph 1 
provides in par t t h a t : 
" a l l r e n t a l s or purchases of goods or M a t e r i a l s by 
buyer from s e l l e r are made sub jec t to tjhis account agreement 
on such t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s as may be i s t a ted on i n v o i c e s 
and o the r documents prepared and submit ted by s e l l e r to 
buyer in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the s a l e or 
buyer" 
ease of goods to 
Paragraph 2(b) provides t h a t : 
"a l l payments received by s e l l e r s shall] be applied f i r s t to 
i n t e r e s t , then to pas t due accounts , ttjen to cu r r en t 
purchases and ren t . " 
The agreement was signed by Mi tche l l D. Henderson and also 
by James Snarr on behal f of the For-Shor Company. Mr. 
Henderson's bus iness dea l ings from 1976 through 1978 were then 
documented both by invoices and ledger s t a t e m e n t s , most of which 
were also executed by Mr. Henderson and which he acknowledged in 
t h e c o u r s e of the t r i a l . (TVI p . 18 . , 1. 22 - - p . 19, 1. 2; Exs. 
3, 4, 5) All of the documents used in the blusiness r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between Henderson and For-Shor included c l ea r and e x p l i c i t 
language to the e f f ec t t h a t For-Shor Company would r e t a i n t i t l e 
in a l l merchandise e i t h e r rented or sold untlil f u l l y paid. The 
Court w i l l note the language a t the bottom o|f the invoices 
i d e n t i f i e d as T r i a l Exhib i t s 4 and 5, which treads as fo l lows: 
" I t i s understood tha t t i t l e to a l l merchandise l i s t e d on t h i s 
i n v o i c e r e m a i n s w i t h Fo r -Shor Company u n t i l f u l l y p a i d fo r by 
p u r c h a s e r . " 
In b o l d p r i n t a t t h e b o t t o m of e a c h i n v o i c e was t h e n o t i c e 
t h a t "SALES SUBJECT TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS APPEARING ON FACE AND 
REVERSE SIDE". The r e v e r s e s i d e of each i n v o i c e i n d i c a t e d 
f i r s t l y by t i t l e in bo ld p r i n t t h a t t h e document c o n t a i n e d a 
C o n d i t i o n a l S a l e s C o n t r a c t , and f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e d in p a r t 
, ? the t i t l e to s a i d p r o p e r t y s h a l l r e m a i n in vendor u n t i l t h e 
f u l l p u r c h a s e p r i c e i s pa id •.. and i f d e f a u l t be made by 
t h e v e n d e e in any p a y m e n t o r in any o f t h e t e r m s o f t h e 
s a l e , t h e vendor s h a l l have the r i g h t , a t i t s e l e c t i o n , t o 
d e c l a r e a f o r f e i t u r e h e r e u n d e r and may t a k e p o s s e s s i o n of 
s a i d p r o p e r t y , w i t h t h e r i g h t of e n t r y upon any p r e m i s e s 
where s a i d p r o p e r t y may be and remove t h e r e f r o m w i t h o u t 
l e g a 1 p r o c e s s , and t he r eupon a l l of t he v e n d e e ' s r i g h t s in 
o r to s a i d p r o p e r t y s h a l l c e a s e and a l l payments t h e r e t o f o r 
made bv t h e v e n d e e s h a l l be r e t a i n e d by t h e v e n d o r a s r e n t a l 
for t h e use of s a i d p r o p e r t y . 1 1 
F u r t h e r m o r e , in bo ld p r i n t i t p r o v i d e d : 
"THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE INTERPRETED AND GOVERNED BY THE 
UTAH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 70A-1 -101 e t seq ." 
These c o n t r a c t u a l p r o v i s i o n s and n o t i c e s appea red on a l l of 
t h e i n v o i c e s u t i l i z e d by t h e p a r t i e s to e v i d e n c e t h e i r numerous 
t r a n s a c t i o n s d u r i n g t h e t h r e e yea r p e r i o d of t h e i r b u s i n e s s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
By Junp of 1978, Mr. Henderson had become s e r i o u s l y 
d e l i n q u e n t in h i s r e n t a l o b l i g a t i o n to Defendant and had f a i l e d 
to r e t u r n numerous i t e m s . On June 30, 1978 and p u r s u a n t to 
c o n t r a c t and a g r e e m e n t , Fo r -Shor Company e l e c t e d t o c o n v e r t t h e 
r e n t a l s t o a p u r c h a s e a r r a n g e m e n t . (TVI p . 19, 1 . 20 - p . 20 , 1 . 
13 ; Ex. 4) The i n v o i c e i t e m i z e d t h e p r o p e r t y b e i n g c o n v e r t e d 
which i n c l u d e d 55, two by e i g h t p a n e l s ; 22 s i x inch i n s i d e by 
e i e h t f e e t c o r n e r p a n e l s ; 50, two by four p a n e l s ; 4, s i x inch 
i n s ide corner by four fee t pane l s ; 50, wedg^ b o l t s ; 50, two by 
four walers 1 , and 50 Z wale r s . Also a c r e d i t of t h r ee months 
r e n t was given, l eav ing , a f t e r t ax , a t o t a l purchase p r i c e of 
$5,119.21. Shor t ly t h e r e a f t e r P l a i n t i f f Henderson entered into 
n e g o t i a t i o n s with the Defendant to adjust tike purchase p r i ce and 
the p a r t i e s subsequent ly agreed to an a d d i t i o n a l c r e d i t of 
$2,180.83 (TVI p . 44, i . 6 -13 ; Ex. 5) thus r e d u c i n g the t o t a l 
purchase p r i ce for t ha t p roper ty from $5,11|9.21 to $2,938.38. 
Add i t i ona l ly , Mr. Henderson had accumulated before the June, 1978 
purchase a separa te ou t s tand ing account balance of $5,371.64, 
which was for merchandise and r e n t a l s o ther than those i temized 
on Exhibi t 4. (Exhibit 3) After the account adjustments of 
Exhibi t 5 and a p p l i c a t i o n of accrued i n t e r e s t , the new s ta tement 
balance as of July 31, 1978, as shown on Trijal Exhibi t No. 3, was 
$8 ,^29.12. 
Two days l a t e r , on August 2, 1978, P l a i n t i f f Henderson made 
a cash payment on the account of $6,400.00 ajid incurred an 
add i t ion charge as per invoice number 12514 of $456.33. T r i a l 
Exhibi t No. 3 evidences t h a t as of August 2, 1978 the account 
balance owing was $2,385.45. In accordance k i t h the account 
agreement (Exhibit 17), P l a i n t i f f ! s cash payment was c red i t ed 
aga ins t the old account balance of $5,371.64 f i r s t , then to the 
new p u r c h a s e s on E x h i b i t 4; t h e r e s u l t of wh|ich was t h a t t h e 
i tems purchsed in June 1978 (Exhibit No. 4) Rere not fu l l y paid 
for. T r i a l Exhibi t No. 3 fu r the r r e f l e c t s t h a t P l a i n t i f f 
Henderson on August 16, 1978 made a payment on the accoun t in the 
amount of $311.03 and incurred an a d d i t i o n a l charge per invoice 
12817 of $406.21. 
Ev iden t ly , P l a i n t i f f Henderson's loan a t F i r s t Secu r i ty Bank 
of Smithf ie ld for the purchase of the I n t e r s t a t e forms became 
de l inquent sometime in t-he summer of 1978. P l a i n t i f f ' s 
Grandmother, I teen B u t t a r s , r a i s ed the money to pay off the 
o b l i g a t i o n to F i r s t Secur i ty Bank. (TVI pp. 82-85) Mrs. Bu t ta r s 
t e s t i f i e d a t a t t r i a l t ha t she knew very l i t t l e about Mi tche l l 
Henderson's bus iness except t h a t he was in se r ious f i n a n c i a l 
d i f f i c u l t y a t the time she paid F i r s t Secur i ty Bank. (TVI p. 82, 
1. 7-10; p . 84, 1. 18-20) She had n o t , no r had M i t c h e l l n o t i f i e d 
For-Shor of the pay off to F i r s t Secur i ty Bank. She never had 
occasion to inspec t , count, or i den t i fy the forms which F i r s t 
Secur i ty Bank had claimed as s e c u r i t y and which she had redeemed. 
She understood, however, t h a t she was acqu i r ing an i n t e r e s t , i f 
any, was only in the forms which F i r s t Secur i ty Bank had claimed 
as c o l l a t e r a l by v i r t u e of her repayment of that- loan. She never 
pe r sona l ly used, nor managed the use of the forms a f t e r repayment 
of the F i r s t S e c u r i t y loan and never r e c e i v e d the same i n t o her 
possess ion . The forms remained for a l l t imes in the possess ion 
and control of her Grandson Mi tche l l Henderson, who had f u l l and 
u n r e s t r i c t e d use of the same. The forms were k e p t a t h i s 
mother 's r e s idence and he on occassion rented them out . 
P l a i n t i f f Mi tche l l Henderson r e t a i n e d a l l of the incomes t h a t 
were g e n e r a t e d on the fo rms . (TVI, D. 71, 1. 19) Mrs. B u t t a r s 
never rece ived any accounting for t h e i r use or r e n t a l and never 
requested an account ing. She never repor ted any income from the 
forms or claimed revenue from them on her personal income tax 
r e t u r n s . Her Grandson, on the o ther hand, u t i l i z e d the forms in 
h i s bus iness and claimed the income as h i s pwn. At t r i a l , Mrs. 
Bu t ta r s t e s t i f i e d t ha t she was uncer ta in whether the money she 
p rov ided to p a y o f f F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank was a loan to her 
Grandson or a purchase of the c o l l a t e r a l hel|d by F i r s t Secur i ty 
Bank. (TV1 pp. 86-87) S i g n i f i c a n t l y , both sh$ and her Grandson 
however had a fu l l expec ta t ion and i n t en t i on t h a t Mi tche l l would 
even tua l ly repay her tha t sum. 
Defendant For-Shor Company did l i t t l e f i i r ther bus iness with 
P l a i n t i f f Mi tche l l Henderson during 1978, an<3 was t h e r e a f t e r 
unable to l oca t e him again u n t i l the f a l l of 197 9. During tha t 
p e r i o d of t ime no payments had been made on tfhe accoun t and For -
Shor Company had r e fe r r ed the account to i t s a t t o rneys for 
c o l l e c t i o n . In Ju ly of 1979 s u i t was f i l ed aga ins t Henderson. 
He was served with a copy of the Summons and Complaint on August 
26, 1979 in Cache County, Utah. (Exhibit 24) A few days l a t e r 
P l a i n t i f f Henderson contacted Mr. Duane Burnet t , then counsel for 
Defendant, regard ing the l a w s u i t . (TVIII, p. 500, 1. 11 - - p . 
502, 1. 7) Mr. Burnett t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l t h^ t in the course of 
the conversa t ion Mr. Henderson represen ted t h a t he wished to 
r e s o l v e the ou ts tand ing o b l i g a t i o n but t h a t he was unable to pay 
the e n t i r e amount off in one lump sum. He f a r t h e r represen ted 
t h a t the spec i f i c forms and merchandise which had been purchased 
from the For -Shor Company had been s t o l e n in of J u l y of 1 979, and 
t h a t the re was no c o l l a t e r a l a v a i l a b l e to sattisfy the ou ts tanding 
o b l i g a t i o n . Mr. Burnet t advised Mr. Hendersoh t h a t he should 
contac t Mr. James Snarr of the For-Shor Company d i r e c t l y . 
On September 6, 1979, P l a i n t i f f Mi t che l l Henderson v i s i t e d 
Mr. Snarr a t the For-Shor o f f i c e s in Sa l t Lake City and 
nego t i a t ed with the For-Shor Company an arrangement to repay the 
then ou t s t and ing account balance of $3,748.43 by making monthly 
i n s t a l l m e n t s of approximately $340.00. (Exhibi t 37) At the 
r eques t of Mr. Snarr, Mr. Henderson executed a w r i t t e n 
I n s t a l l m e n t Promissory Note evidencing h i s agreement to repay 
t h a t ba lance over t ime. For-Shor Company had agreed to allow Mr. 
Henderson to repay the o b l i g a t i o n in accordance with the 
Promissory Note r a t h e r than e l e c t i n g to proceed with the l a w s u i t , 
based upon Henderson's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t the forms had been 
s to len and were no longer a v a i l a b l e as c o l l a t e r a l , and upon Mr. 
Henderson's promise to pay as se t fo r th in the n o t e , and also 
based upon the fact t h a t i t had been very d i f f i c u l t to l oca t e Mr. 
Henderson over the past year and the prospect of r ece iv ing 
payment by any o the r device did not appear to be good. (TVII p . 
501, 1. 15 - - D. 502, 1. 24) The Promissory Note was received as 
evidence at t r i a l as Exhibi t No. 37. 
After making one or two payments on the Note, P l a i n t i f f 
Henderson defaul ted and For-Shor Company obtained a Default 
Judgment on February 13, 1980, in the sum $3,831.78. By t h a t 
time For-Shor had again l o s t t r ack of Mr. Henderson and had no 
fu r ther knowledge of h i s whereabouts or dea l ings u n t i l Ju ly of 
1981 when Defendant repossessed most of the forms i t had 
o r i g i n a l l y sold to Mr. Henderson per T r i a l Exhibi t No. 4. 
Evident ly , Mi t che l l Henderson f i l e d Bankruptcy on or about 
Ju ly 16, 1980. Although For-Shor Company was named on the 
c r e d i t o r ma t r i x , i t never received n o t i c e of the Bankruptcy, and 
never f i l ed a claim in those proceedings . (fTVII p . 238, 1. 8-15) 
One reason tha t Defendant did not r ece ive n o t i c e of the 
Bankruptcy proceedings may have been an improper address assigned 
to the Defendant on t h e m a i l i n g m a t r i x . (TYII p . 209, 1. 1 - p . 
210, 1. 17) The address given was another cement forming company 
which did bus iness adjacent to the o f f i c e s of the For-Shor 
Company. Add i t iona l ly the name of the Defendant was mispe l l ed . 
Reeardles of the reason, Defenant did not h^ve ac tua l knowledge 
of the Bankruptcy and undertook no ac t ion aa a r e s u l t of the 
same. 
One year l a t e r , in Ju ly of 1981, i t canje to the Defendant's 
a t t e n t i o n , qu i t e by chance, t h a t Mi tche l l He|nderson had in h i s 
possess ion and was s t o r i ng c e r t a i n cement fcfrms. Defendant, 
through i t s agen ts , went to C]arkston, Utah £nd determined tha t 
both Wall master and Mod-u-form forms were scored at what they 
l a t e r learned to be the r e s idence of Mr. Henderson's mother. 
(TVII p . 293, 1. 20 - p . 294, 1. 4) Mr. Dan Sharp t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
he was able to determine tha t the re was approximately one or more 
s e t s of Wallmaster forms and more than one se t of Mod-u-form 
forms stored at the Henderson res idence . Using invoice number 
11754 (Tria l Exhibi t No. 4), which was the o r i g i n a l purchase 
invoice , Mr. Sharp repossessed what he on behal f of For-Shor 
be l ieved to be the merchandise which had bepfi sold to P l a i n t i f f 
Mitchel l Henderson under the t i t l e r e t e n t i o n agreement of June 
1978. A comparison of the inventory of thos<£ forms repossed (see 
T r i a l Exhibi t s 27 and 28), r e v e a l s t h a t j u s t l e s s than a l l of the 
i t e m s sold to Mr. Henderson in 1 978 were r e p o s s e d by the For -Shor 
Company in July 1981. 
Mr. Sharp t e s t i f i e d that , using a rental truck, he and 
another employee entered the Henderson premises along a gravel 
driveway, leaving the truck on the driveway, and loaded the forms 
onto the truck. I t took approximately forty five minutes to load 
the truck, whereupon they lef t the premises in the same manner as 
they had arrived. Mr. Sharp t e s t i f i ed that he did not see any 
signs prohibit ing pntry along the driveway nor was he contacted 
or confronted by anyone during the course of the repossesion, and 
t h a t he caused no damage to any p roper ty in the course of t h a t 
ac t i v i t v . (TVII p. 298, 1. 9-8) P la in t i f f Laurena B. 
Henderson t e s t i f i ed that she observed the same truck enter the 
premises and watched the a c t i v i t i e s of two men as they loaded the 
truck for a period of approximately three to five minutes and 
then l e f t . (TVI p. 96, 1. 6 - - p. 97, 1. 6) Mrs. Henderson 
t e s t i f i ed that there were several No Trespassing signs and Do Not 
Enter signs posted on buildings about the premises but that the 
men who took the forms did not en te r any b u i l d i n g s . She fu r the r 
t e s t i f i ed that the truck upon leaving drove over a portion of her 
yard, but that there was no resul t ing damamge. (TVI p. 97, 1. 6-
11; TVI p. 106, 1. 15-24) At page 8, l i n e s 20 and 21 of her 
deposition taken July 20, 1984, Mrs. Henderson, in response to 
the ques t ion "And was there any damage caused as a r e s u l t of 
that?" , answered "Oh, not enough to worry about." At page 10, 
l ines 10 through 16 of the same deposition t ranscr ip t , Mrs. 
Henderson further t e s t i f i ed that she was accustomed to 
c o n t r a c t o r s or 1aborers or o ther people coming in and out of her 
premises to get forms. 
At t r i a l , P l a i n t i f f s o f f e r e d no t e s t i m o n y as to the v a l u e of 
t h e forms t a k e n . Mr. Sna r r f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e c o s t to 
r e c o n d i t i o n a form i n c l u d i n g plywood, l a b o r and m a t e r i a l s bu t 
e x c l u d i n g s a n d b l a s t i n g and p a i n t i n g , would be a p p r o x i m a t e l y 24% 
o f t h e c u r r e n t l i s t p r i c e , (TVI I I p . 4 4 1 . 1 , 1 5 - 2 5 ) and t h a t t h e 
For -Shor Company t y p i c a l l y p u r c h a s e s used orf r e c o n d i t i o n e d forms 
f o r be tween 40% to 50% of f t h e l i s t p r i c e . 
A p p a r e n t l y d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d from J u l y 1978 u n t i l J u l y 1981 
l i t t l e use was made of t h e forms by Mr. Henlderson. During t h a t 
t h r e e yea r p e r i o d l e s s t h a n $2,500.00 in gr<l>ss r e n t s was 
g e n e r a t e d from Mr. Hender son ' s use of a l l the forms he had in h i s 
p o s s e s s i o n , which i n c l u d e d b o t h f u l l s e t s a c q u i r e d from 
I n t e r s t a t e I n d u s t r i e s and p ledged as c o l l a t e r a l to F i r s t 
S e c u r i t y , as w e l l a s t he a p p r o x i m a t e h a l f s|et a c q u i r e d from t h e 
F o r - S h o r Company. (TVI p . 34, 1. 12-19) P l l a i n t i f f M i t c h e l l 
Henderson t e s t i f i e d , however , t h a t he had tfeen a t t e m p t i n g d u r i n g 
t h a t p e r i o d of t i m e t o s e l l a l l of t h e f o r m s w h i c h he had in h i s 
p o s s e s s i o n b u t w i t h o u t any s u c c e s s . (TVI £>. 31 - p . 32) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The f o l l o w i n g i s a summary of a rguments D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
h e r e b y p r e s e n t s to the c o u r t on a p p e a l : 
1. R i g h t t o r e p o s s e s s . Defendant c l a i m s t h a t t h e 
r e p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e f o r m s was l a w f u l and t h a t i t had a r i g h t t o 
r e p o s s e s s t he forms p u r s u a n t to t h e t i t l e r e t e n t i o n agreement a s 
s t a t e d on the i n v o i c e s s igned by Henderson . Defendant m a i n t i a n s 
t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d in c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e r e p o s s e s s i o n 
was n o t l e g a l h o l d i n g t h a t the forms had t>een purchased by 
Henderson, the l as t payment being in the form of a promissory 
note accepted by Defendant. Defendant claims that the promissory 
note was fraudulently issued in that Henderson stated that the 
forms had been stolen when in fact they had not been stolen. 
Because of Henderson's misrepresentat ions, the promissory note is 
void and of no effect. Therefore, the forms had never been paid 
for and t i t l e has never been transferred from For-Shor to 
Henderson. 
2. Sale of the forms to Ilene Buttars as "bona fide 
purchaser". Defendant claims that Henderson had no t i t l e to the 
For-Shor forms and could not transfer t i t l e to his grandmother, 
Mrs. Buttars. Furthermore, the forms purportedly sold to Buttars 
were forms secured to Fi rs t Security Bank, not Forshor forms and 
the t r a n s f e r of the forms to Mrs. But ta rs was in the form of a 
loan and not a sale . There was never a sale of the Defendant's 
forms to Mrs. Buttars. 
3. Damages awarded to P la in t i f f Hales. The t r i a l court 
awarded Hale damages of $265.00 for an overcharge by For-Shor on 
separate ren ta l s to Hale, claiming that For-Shor charged Hale to 
clean forms when the forms had been delivered to Hale d i r ty . 
P la in t i f f Hale did not plead the overcharge on ren ta l s in the 
Complaint, nor any amendment thereto , nor were the damages for 
the overcharge proven by Hale in that Hale had not paid the 
overcharge. 
4. Damages for loss of r en ta l . P la in t i f f s did not offer 
evidence to es tabl i sh lost prof i ts for loss of r e n t a l s . 
Defendant maintains there is no evidence to support the 
judgment and award of damages for loss of rent claimed by 
P la in t i f f s and that P la in t i f f s 1 claim was ba$ed solely on 
speculation of future potent ia l p ro f i t s . No evidence was 
presented to es tabl ish future renta l income with any reasonable 
degree of cer ta in ty . 
5. Value of forms. P la in t i f f s did not offer competent 
evidence or testimony regarding the value of the forms which were 
repossessed by For-Shor. The value claimed |by P la in t i f f was 
based on conjecture and speculation outlined in P la in t i f f s t r i a l 
brief, and not based on proper evidence. therefore, damages for 
the value of the forms should not have been awarded. 
6. Damage f o r t r e s p a s s . P l a i n t i f f s a d m i t t e d a t t r i a l t h a t 
t h e r e was no damage c a u s e d by t h e t r e s s p a s s ) , i f a n y , made in 
r e p o s s e s s i n g the fo rms . Defendant m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e r e was 
i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t a judgment and award of damages 
fo r t r e s p a s s and t h a t the judgment was bas^d upon s p e c u l a t i o n . 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
FOR-SHOR'S REPOSSESSION OF THE F0RMS WAS 
LAWFUL BECAUSE THE MISREPRESENTATION OF 
HENDERSON VOIDED THE PROMISSORY I^TOTE GIVEN 
TO FOR-SHOR, AND PURSUANT TO THE TITLE RETENTION 
AGREEMENT HELD BY FOR-SHOR, TIT^E TO THE 
FORMS RENTED BY MITCHELL HENDERSION DID NOT 
PASS TO MITCHELL HENDERSON. 
P l a i n t i f f M i t c h e l l Henderson a l m o s t i jmmediate ly a f t e r hav ing 
been se rved w i t h a Summons and Compla in t by t h e Defendant in 
August, 1^79, contacted the Defendant's At torney, Duane Burne t t , 
and s t a t e d t h a t t he forms in q u e s t i o n had been s t o l e n t h e month 
be fore , and the only way for For-Shor to recover anything would 
be i f he could work ou t an a r r a n g e m e n t to pay over t i m e . James 
Snarr then allowed Henderson to enter into the Promissory Note of 
September 6, 1979, based upon the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n tha t the forms 
no l o n g e r e x i s t e d and t h a t t h e r e was no c o l l a t e r a l to s u p p o r t the 
claim of For-Shor Company. The fact t h a t Mr. Henderson 
represen ted t h a t the forms had been s to len i s confirmed by T r i a l 
Exhibi t No. 29, h i s Bankruptcy P e t i t i o n , wherein Mr. Henderson 
s t a t e d under oa th , a t ques t ion fourteen of the Statement of 
Affa i r s a t the beginning of h i s Bankruptcy P e t i t i o n , t h a t the 
forms were s to len in Weber County in Ju ly , 1979. In a c t u a l i t y , 
the forms t h a t Mr. Henderson had purchased in June, 1 978 from 
For-Shor ( i d e n t i f i e d by T r i a l Exhibi t No. 4) were in h i s 
possess ion in Clarkston, Utah, on the date t h a t he executed the 
Promissory Note in September 1979. His m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 
t h e f t made the Note a t the very l e a s t vo idab le , a t the e l e c t i o n 
of the For-Shor Company. In Tanner vs D i s t r i c t Judges, Utah, 649 
P.2d 5 (1982) the Utah Supreme Court s t a t e d , "An agreement 
obtained by m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , fraud, or mis take is g e n e r a l l y 
vo idab le . " (See a l so 17 Am Jur 2d Section 151). 
I t i s gene ra l l y accepted t ha t p roper ty obtained by fraud and 
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n cannot be t r ans fe red to a t h i r d pa r ty purchaser 
in cont rovent ion to the t i t l e and ownership of the o r i g i n a l 
owner. In Panhandle Pipe and Supply Co. v. S.W. Pressey and Son, 
243 P.2d 756 (Col. 1952) Panhandle Pipe had agreed to s e l l a 
t ruck load of wel l casing pipe to one L.S. Ol iver , for an agreed 
p r i ce of $2,491.86 to be paid on d e l i v e r y . When Panhandle's 
employee de l ivered the pipe to Ol iver , Oliver informed the 
employee tha t he was unable to obta in the c a s h i e r s check from h i s 
bank because the bank had no t opened when he l e f t town and asked 
t h e employee i f he could forward a check to Banhandle on t h e 
fol lowing day. When the employee at tempted to c a l l Panhandle to 
determine i f h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s could be modified, Oliver took the 
load of pipe without paying for i t . I t was l a t t e r discovered 
tha t Oliver had taken the pipe to S.W. Press^y and Son and had 
sold i t to Pressey for cash. Panhandle filefd an ac t ion in 
r ep lev in seeking to have the pipe re tu rned tpo i t . The Supreme 
Court of Colarado ruled t h a t even though Pr$ssey was an innocent 
purchaser for va lue , Ol iver ' s fraud and the subsequent ac t ion 
was su f f i cen t to j u s t i f y the r e p l e v i n . The Colarado court noted 
in the ac t i on , t ha t where the sa le-was a ca|sh s a l e , t i t l e to the 
proper ty did not pass to purchaser u n t i l th|e cash had been 
rece ived , un less the r e c e i p t had been waived by the s e l l e r . The 
cour t quoted and Oregon case , Johnson v. I&nkovetz, 1 10 P. 398, 
and s t a t ed as fo l lows: 
There is a d i s t i n c t i o n between a sale^ induced by fraud, in 
which the vendor, in ignorance of the fraud, t r a n s f e r s the 
t i t l e and posses ions , in which the sa le i s voidable but not 
void, and an innocent purchaser from £he vendee may acquire 
a good t i t l e , [ c i t i n g c a s e s ] ; and a c^se in which the vendor 
does no t i n t end to pass w i th the t i t l e u n t i l the p r i c e i s 
paid , the d i l i v e r y and payment being [concurrent a c t s , and 
al though the goods are de l ivered to toe vendee, ye t , wi thout 
payment, no t i t l e w i l l pass . In the one case i t i s 
intended t h a t the t i t l e s h a l l pass ; i|n the o the r , t h a t i t 
s h a l l no t p a s s . 243 P.2d a t 760. 
The cour t a lso noted t h a t mere possess ion of the pe r sona l ty 
f r audu len t ly obtained was not alone enough to p r o t e c t a good 
f a i t h purchaser aga ins t the demands of the defrauded owner and 
t h a t the a u t h o r i e s ind ica ted tha t possess ion must be accompanied 
by i n d i c i o n of t i t l e . 243 P.2d a t 761. 
In the i n s t a n t a c t i on , the invoices and account agreement 
wi th Henderson a l l c l e a r l y s t a t e d the t i t l e would not pass to him 
u n t i l the equipment had been paid for. Since the promissory note 
was accepted by For-Shor only on the m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
Henderson t h a t the forms had been s t o l e n and could no t be 
re tu rned to For-Shor, the promissory note does not c o n s t i t u t e 
payment for the equipment and t i t l e t h e r e i n remained with For-
Shor. 
A s i m i l a r dec i s ion was reached in South S e a t t l e Auto Act ion, 
I n c . v. Ladd, 370 P.2d 630 (Or. 1961). South S e a t t l e had r e a c h e d 
and agreement with V i rg i l Anderson to al low Anderson to obta in 
used au tomobi les , r econd i t i on them, and then s e l l them a t South 
Sea t t1e f s auc t ion . South S e a t t l e would d e l i v e r a s igh t d ra f t for 
the purchase of the v e h i c l e s and would honor the s igh t d ra f t when 
t i t ] e was d e l i v e r e d to them. During a p e r i o d of t i m e in l a t e 
1959, Anderson obtained severa l automobiles in t h a t manner, the 
t i t l e s being sent to South S e a t t l e , but Anderson then sold the 
v e h i c l e s to defendant Ladd, a used car dea le r . South S e a t t l e 
f i l e d an ac t ion in r ep lev in to obta in posess ion of the v e h i c l e s 
and Ladd claimed tha t he was a bona fide purchaser . The Oregon 
Court ru led tha t Anderson did not have t i t l e and could not 
t r a n s f e r t i t l e to Ladd and affirmed the judgment and r e p l e v i n . 
The Supreme Court of Oregon quoted an Oregon s t a t u t e s i m i l a r to 
Sect ion 7 of the former Utah Uniform Sales Act (U.C.A. 60-2-7) : 
Subject to the provisions of th i s chapter, where goods 
are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and 
who does not s e l l them under the authori ty or with the 
consent of the owner, the buyer acquire$ no be t t e r t i t l e 
to the goods than the se l l e r had, unles$ the owner of the 
goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the s e l l e r ' s 
authori ty to s e l l . 370 P2d at 638. 
The Oregon Court ruled that even though Anderson had 
posession of the vehicles , that his attempt to se l l the vehicles 
without authori ty was a fraudulent act and slince he did not have 
t i t l e , he could not transfer t i t l e to the s e l l e r . 
A s imilar case in Utah also referr ing to former Section 60-
2-7, Utah Code Annotated, ruled that the owner of the goods by 
his conduct was precluded from denying the se l l e r s authori ty to 
sell and that the owner could not repossess the property. 
In Heaston v. Mart inez, 282 P.2d 833, 3 Utah 2d 259 (1955) 
P la in t i f f s had delivered automobiltes to one M. R. Bruce doing 
business as Ra Don Auto Sales in Salt Lake. P la in t i f f was a 
wholesale used car dealer and delivered the vehicle to Bruce 
together with a s igh t d r a f t to be paid by B^ruce on the sa le of 
the vehicle. P la in t i f f was to t i t l e to the vehicle un t i l payment 
was received. Bruce then sold the vehicle without honoring the 
sight draft and did not convey t i t l e to the buyer. The p la in t i f f 
then filed an action to repossess. the t r i a l court held that 
the delivering of possession to Bruce coupted with Brucefs 
apparant authori ty to se l l the vehicle in the ordinary course of 
business was sufficent to allow him to sel|l the vehicle to the 
buyers. The Utah Supreme Court, in a s p l i t decision, upheld the 
t r i a l court 's decision refusing to allow the repossession. The 
dissenting opinion by Just ice Henriod pointed out that the 
P l a i n t i f f withheld the t i t l e in an e f fo r t to prevent j u s t such a 
1 Q 
s i tua t ion . The dissent claimed that possession alone was not 
sufficent to j u s t i fy a t ransfer of t i t l e and if possession were 
sufficent , i t would be a hazard to leave ones car to be parked 
for a fee, leaving i t for necessary repa i r s , or even loaning i t 
to dear f r i end . 282 p.2d at 838. 
In Richardson v^ Sea t t le F i r s t National Bank, 299 P.2d 341 
(Wash. 1951) The p l a in t i f f sold her car to a person claiming his 
name to be Thornton and r ep re sen t ing himself to be an agent of 
the Central Oldsmobile Company of Seat t le . He issued a check in 
the name of Central Oldsmobile Co. for the purchase price of the 
car, and the P la in t i f f endorsed in blank the c e r t i f i c a t e of t i t l e 
and gave i t to Thorton. As i t turned out, the check was a 
forgery and the man l a t e r sold the vehicle to an automobile 
dealer in Belview, Washington, again forging the P l a in t i f f ' s name 
on the t i t l e . The P la in t i f f s brought an action to repossess the 
car and the t r i a l court allowed the replevin rul ing that the 
t i t l e had been obtained by fraud and was unenforcable. The court 
ruled that even though the purchaser was innocent and 
unknowledgeable of the fraud, the se l l e r could t ransfer no be t t e r 
t i t l e than he held. Since the t i t l e he obtained was through 
fraud, he obtained no t i t l e and could, therefore, not transfer 
t i t l e . 
In the instant act ion, any t i t l e in the equipment claimed 
by Henderson was void since the t i t l e would necessar i ly have to 
have been obtained through Henderson's misrepresentat ion. Had 
Henderson not stated that the forms had been stolen, For-Shor 
would have ei ther required the forms to be returned or that 
Henderson execute a valid securi ty agreement to secure the note. 
Therefore, Henderson had no t i t l e he could t ransfer . 
In addition to the fact that the promi$sory note was 
void because of the misrepresentation of Hepderson, there is no 
evidence to support P la in t i f f s 1 contention fhat the note i t s e l f 
was given as payment for the outstanding obligation or to 
const i tu te a release of the c o l l a t e r a l . Indeed, i t is often 
customary that a promissory note i s executed simply to evidence 
the agreement between debtors and credi tors for payment. There 
i s nothing in the content of the note to suggest a release or 
waiver of Defendants claim to the subject property. Factually 
one could only conclude tha t the note was ^iven to r e in fo rce the 
obligation and was an addit ional assurance of payment rather than 
a compromise of the exist ing posit ion of the credi tor . 
The promissory note also has the effect of confirming that a 
balance indeed was due to For-Shor from Mn. Henderson in the 
amount of $3,748.43 as of September 6, 197|9, contrary to his 
tes t imony in court t ha t he had paid the ac|count in August of 
1978. Henderson has provided no evidence that Defendant 
knowingly or voluntar i ly waived i t f s t i t l ^ or claim to the 
subject property. The testimony was cle^r that because of the 
misrepresentations of Mitchell Henderson, the Defendant obtained 
judgment on the promissory note believing that the property had 
in fact been stolen in July, 1979. I t would be both i l l ega l and 
inequitable to allow the P la in t i f f now to benefit from his deceit 
and misrepresentation. 
I I 
THERE WAS NO BONIFIED SALE OF THE FORMS FROM 
HENDERSON TO BUTTARS. FOR-SHORS SECURITY 
INTEREST REMAINED INVALID AND INTACT UP TO AND 
INCLUDING THE DATE OF REPOSSESSION 
I t m u s t be f i r s t n o t e d t h a t t h e r e i s a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n 
be tween the forms pu rchased by M i t c h e l l Henderson from I n t e r s t a t e 
I n d u s t r i e s in 1976, and the forms p u r c h a s e d from Defendant in 
J u n e , 1978. Defendant c l a i m s , and has o n l y c l a i m e d , an i n t e r e s t 
in t h e p r o p e r t y so ld to Henderson in June of 1978. That p r o p e r t y 
i s i d e n t i f i e d by T r i a l E x h i b i t No. 4 and i s s u b j e c t to the 
c o n d i t i o n t h a t t he For -Shor Company r e t a i n t i t l e to t h e 
m e r c h a n d i s e u n t i l i t was f u l l y p a i d by the p u r c h a s e r . 
The p r o p e r t y which P l a i n t i f f p u r p o r t e d l y so ld to h i s 
Grandmother , I I e e n B u t t a r s , in Sep tember , 1978 was o n l y t h e 
p r o p e r t y in which F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank had c l a i m e d a c o l l a t e r a l 
i n t e r e s t . 
A r e v i e w o f T r i a l E x h i b i t s No. 3, No. 4 and No. 5 a s w e l l a s 
t h e o t h e r i n v o i c e s s igned by Mr. Henderson in t h e c o u r s e of h i s 
y e a r s of b u s i n e s s d e a l i n g s w i t h t he Defendant o n l y j u s t i f i e s one 
c o n c l u s i o n , t h a t Mr. Henderson was to a c q u i r e t i t l e to t h e 
p r o p e r t y r e c e i v e d from For -Shor o n l y on the c o n d i t i o n t h a t he 
pa id for t he same. Mr. Henderson has acknowledged on numerous 
o c c a s i o n s and a t T r i a l t h a t t h e r e was a r e m a i n i n g b a l a n c e due on 
h i s a c c o u n t , and T r i a l E x h i b i t No. 17 c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e 
a c c o u n t ag reemen t be tween the p a r t i e s r e q u i r e s t h a t a l l payments 
r e c e i v e d were t o be a p p l i e d f i r s t to i n t e r e s t , t hen to p a s t due 
a c c o u n t s and then to c u r r e n t n u r c h a s e s and r e n t s . The e v i d e n c e 
i s clear that any payments received from Mr. Henderson on the 
account were properly applied. 
Section 70A-9-102(2) of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
defines t i t l e re tent ion and conditional sale contracts as 
securi ty agreements and subjects them to the provisions of the 
Code. Section 70A-9-201 provides tha t : 
Except as otherwise provided by th i s adt a securi ty 
agreement i s effective according to i t s terms between the 
pa r t i e s , against purchasers of the co l l a t e r a l and against 
credi tors . (emphasis added) 
Section 70A-9-306 (2) provides in part as follows: 
Except where th i s chapter otherwise provides, a 
securi ty in te res t continues in co l l a t e ra l notwithstanding 
sal e, exchange or other disposi t ion thjereof unless the 
disposit ion was authorized by the secujred party in the 
securi ty agreement or otherwise, (emphasis added) 
I t is clear that under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
For-Shor Company retained a securi ty in te res t in the property 
identif ied by Trial Exhibit No. 4. Obviouslly if Mr. Henderson 
retained possession of that property un t i l i t was repossessed, 
then the provisions for default and repossession of the Uniform 
Commercial Code apply. If Mr. Henderson did in fact s e l l , and 
his Grandmother did in fact purchase, that property, together 
with the co l l a t e r a l secured by Fi rs t Securlity Bank, i t is s t i l l 
clear that the securi ty in te res t of For-Shpr is paramount and 
superior to any claim of Mrs. Buttars. Thje following factors 
should be considered in determining whether or not Mrs. Buttars 
actualy purchased the For-Shor property: 
1. She was only aware of forms held as c o l l a t e r a l by 
Fi rs t Security Bank. 
2. F i r s t Secur i ty Bank did not have a s e c u r i t y 
i n t e r e s t in the forms sold by For-Shor to Mr. Henderson in 
June of 1 978. 
3. The B i l l of Sale prepared by Mr. Henderson to h i s 
Grandmother (Exhibit 2) makes no w a r r a n t i e s of t i t l e . 
4. Mrs. Bu t ta r s descr ibed her redemption of the 
p r o p e r t y from F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank as a loan to her Grandson 
and not a s a l e , and expected tha t he would repay he r . 
5. Mr. Henderson acknowledged h i s i n t e n t i o n and 
expec ta t ion to repay h i s Grandmother for paying off the 
F i r s t Secur i ty Loan. 
6. Mrs. But ta r s had no p r i o r or p resen t knowledge of 
Mr. Henderson's bus iness or the concre te forms bus iness in 
g e n e r a l . 
7. Mrs. Bu t ta r s never took the forms in to her 
p o s s e s s i o n or r e c e i v e d use of the same and did no t ever 
manage the use of the forms. 
8. Mr. Henderson made no changes in the course of h i s 
bus iness a f t e r F i r s t Secur i ty Bank had been repayed. He 
continued to possess , use , r e n t and offer for s a l e the 
equipment and o the rwise manage the possess ion of the same. 
9. Mrs. But ta r s never received any income or an 
accounting of the use from the s a l e s or r e n t a l of the forms. 
10. Mr. Henderson received a l l the s a l e s and r e n t a l 
proceeds and never furnished any income to h i s Grandmother. 
11. Mrs. Bu t ta r s never repor ted any income on her 
income tax r e t u r n s for the years 1978 through 1981 and never 
claimed ownership of the forms on her income tax r e t u r n s . 
12. Mrs. But ta r s s t a t ed in an a f f i d a v i t , dated Apri l 
19, 1983 and f i l ed with the cour t , (DCR, pp. 104-105) a t paragraph 
3 thereof , as fo l lows : 
"Both before and a f t e r the date of purchase I b e l i e v e 
t h a t t he equ ipment l i s t e d in the s a i d B i l l of Sa le from 
Mitch was secured by no one o ther than F i r s t Secur i ty Bank 
of Smi thf ie ld . I thought t ha t said Banlj: had loaned Mitch 
the funds to i n i t i a l l y purchase the equipment." 
13. I leen But ta r s s t a t ed under oath in answers to 
Defendant 's I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s in t h i s case dated Ju ly 29, 1982 and 
f i l ed he re in , (DCR, pp 44-52, 45) in responsle to I n t e r r o g a t o r y No. 
4 a f t e r iden t i fy ing a l l of the p r o p e r t i e s sh|e purchased, as being 
the proper ty l i s t e d in the a fo re - re fe renced B i l l of Sale as 
follows : 
MI paid for said equipment ( i d e n t i f i e d in the B i l l of 
Sale) by paying off loans to Mi tche l l D. Henderson from 
F i r s t Secur i ty Bank in Smi th f ie ld , which loans I b e l i e v e , 
were secured by the equipment which I purchased ." 
14. In her depos i t ion of Ju ly 20, 1984, I leen But ta rs 
s t a t ed under oath r e f e r r i n g to the forms secured to F i r s t 
S e c u r i t y Bank a t page 7, l i n e s 24 and 25 arjid page 8, l i n e 1: "Oh, 
the purpose of the loan to begin with was tfo buy those forms11. 
Fur ther , a t page 9 of said Deposi t ion, Mrs. But ta r s t e s t i f i e d 
t h a t a l i t t l e over $30,000.00 was paid to F i r s t Secur i ty Bank to 
pay off M i t c h e l l ' s loan a t the Bank and th^ t she agreed to 
purchase the equipment descr ibed on t h a t document for the sum of 
$26,260.91. Again at page 12, l i n e s 3 through 9, Mrs. But ta rs 
t e s t i f i e d as fo l lows : 
QUESTION: "Tel l me what i t was?" 
ANSWER: "That I was going to purfchase those forms, and they 
would a b s o l u t e l y be my fo rms , and of (course a t t h a t t ime the 
F i r s t Secur i ty held them." 
QUESTION: "Yes?" 
ANSWER: "And then it was paid off, and First Security 
released them to me." 
15. Mitchell Henderson stated under oath in his affidavit 
filed in this matter on May 6, 1983, (DCR, p. 111) at paragraph 5 
as follows: 
"In Sep tember , 1978, I so ld a l l my equ ipment to my 
Grandmother in r e t u r n for her paying off my o b l i g a t i o n s a t 
F i r s t Secur i ty BanV, which were secured by the said forms. 
The amount paid by my Grandmother for the forms and 
equioment was approximately t h e i r f a i r market v a l u e . " 
(emphasis added) 
16. Mrs. Bu t ta r s never counted the forms or inventor ied 
them or had any idea how many forms she a c t u a l l y had o the r 
than as represen ted on the Bil l of Sa le . 
17. A comparison of the I n t e r s t a t e I n d u s t r i e s purchase 
inventory , T r i a l Exhibi t No. 18, wi th the d e s c r i p t i o n of p roper ty 
purchased under the B i l l of Sale, T r i a l Exhibi t No. 2, and the 
For-Shor purchase of June 1978 T r i a l Exhibi t No. 4., r e v e a l s t h a t 
the proper ty a l l e g e d l y purchased by Mrs. But ta r s under the B i l l 
of Sale did not include the i tems purchased from For-Shor in June 
1978. The proper ty i temized under Exhibi t No. 18 i s very n e a r l y 
the same as t h a t under Exhibi t 2. For example, Exhibi t 18 
i n d i c a t e s t ha t there were 150 two by e igh t forms (see item number 
1 and item number 27), and Exhibi t No. 2 i n d i c a t e s t h a t the re 
were 155 two by e igh t panels sold. Exhibi t 18 i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
t h e r e were 100 two by four panels (see i tems 2 and 28), and 
Exhibi t No. 2 i n d i c a t e s 80 two by four pane l s . 
18. In September 1978, the date of the B i l l of Sa le , 
Mr. Henderson supposedly had in h i s possess ion a l l of the forms 
and m a t e r i a l s purchased from I n t e r s t a t e I n d u s t r i e s as wel l as the 
m a t e r i a l s purchased from the For-Shor Company i d e n t i f i e d by T r i a l 
Exhibit No. 4. Mr. Snarr t e s t i f i ed his inventory and 
calculat ions revealed that even after For-Sh0r repossessed i t s 
property, there remained enough forms to equ^l those itemized in 
the B i l l of Sale . 
Even the cour t were to apply only the p r i n c i p a l of 
"substance over form11 i t i s apparent that Mr$. Buttars did not 
purchase any equipment from her Grandson but simply made a loan 
to him ant ic ipat ing and expecting that sometjime he would repay 
the same. Mr. Henderson continued to u t i l i z e a l l of the forms 
pledged to Fi rs t Security as well as those acquired from the For-
Shor Company for his own personal use. I t i|s also apparent that 
i f indeed Mrs. Buttars did purchase property from her Grandson, 
i t was only the property pledged as co l l a t e r a l to F i rs t Security 
Bank and purchased from In te r s t a t e Indust r ies , and unquestionably 
did not include the forms purchased by Henderson from the For-
Shor Company in June of 1 978 (Exhibit 4). 
The evidence is clear that Defendant executed a lawful 
repossesion of the property which i t had claimed a securi ty 
in teres t and retained t i t l e . Section 70A-9-503 of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code provides that a seclured party has, on 
default , the r ight to retake possession of the c o l l a t e r a l . 
"In taking possession a secured party (For-Shor) may 
proceed without jud ic i a l process if th i s can be done without 
breach of the peace or may proceed by action.11 
The clear majority of courts have foupd that repossession of 
proper ty loca ted on the premises of a t h i r d person i s lawful , in 
the absence of some special circumstances. Generally a breach of 
the peace requires a confrontation or a cl0ar objection by the 
debtor or h i s agent (see White and Summers, Uniform Commercial 
Code, pages 968 through 969. Also 75 ALR 3d 1061). 
I t i s a l so c l ea r t ha t a l l of the Mod-u-forms purchased 
e i t h e r through I n t e r s t a t e or d i r e c t l y from For-Shor in 1978 were 
in te rchangeab le , i . e . "fungible11 as defined under the law. 
Black's Law Dic t ionary desc r ibes fungible th ings a s : 
"Movable goods which may be es t imated and replaced according 
to weight , measure and number, t h ings belonging to a c l a s s . 
Those th ings one speciman of which i s as good as ano the r . " 
The p a r t i e s do no t d i s p u t e the f a c t t h a t a l l of the Mod-u-
forms of any p a r t i c u l a r ca tegory , whether they were two by e igh t 
foot pane l s , or two by four foot pane l s , were, wi th in t h e i r 
ca tegory fungib le . (See P l a i n t i f f s 1 T r i a l Brief, Statement of 
Fac t s ) . As a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , i t make l i t t l e d i f f e rence whether 
t he s p e c i f i c form pledged to F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank as opposed to a 
form purchased from For-Shor Company was repossed by Defendant. 
The evidence is t h a t Mr. Henderson or h i s Grandmother s t i l l have 
a l l t he forms l i s t e d on the B i l l of Sa le even a f t e r t h e 
r epossess ion in 1981 by the For-Shor Company and, t h e r e f o r e , have 
not been damaged in any way as a r e s u l t of the r epos se s s ion . 
In a d d i t i o n , Mrs. Bu t ta r s i s in a c lose and c o n f i d e n t i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with her grandson, Mi t che l l Henderson, and i s 
charged with c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e t ha t Henderson did not have 
t i t l e to the equipment rec ieved from For-Shor. In Blodget t vs . 
Martsch, Utah, 590 P.2d 298 (1978), t h i s Court s t a t ed t h a t a 
bona fide purchaser i s one who takes wi thout ac tua l or 
c o n s t r u c t i v e knowledge of f ac t s su f f i cen t to put him on n o t i c e of 
the complainants equi ty . 590 P.2d a t 298. The Blodget ts were 
owners of two adjacent parcels of land locate|d approximately 6100 
South Highland Drive, in Salt Lake. The largler t rac t was a store 
p roper ty and the smal ler t r a c t was u t i l i z e d $s a car wash. 
Blodgetts had leased the smaller t r ac t to Raco Car Wash Systems 
to i n s t a l l a car wash f a c i l i t y . In order to obtain financing, 
Raco was requi red by the Valley Bank and Tru$t to provide 
securi ty for the loan and Blodgetts agreed to execute a t rus t 
deed for that purpose. Blodgetts understood that they would sign 
a t r u s t deed for the car wash parce l but wer$ not informed tha t 
the Bank had l a t e r r equ i red more s e c u r i t y and had added the s to re 
parcel to the t rus t deed. Blodgetts signed the document not 
knowing that i t contained both the store andl car wash proper t ies . 
Raco l a te r defaulted on the loan and the Banlk proceeded to 
forclose on the t rus t deeds. Even at the ti|me of the sale , 
Blodgetts were not aware that the Bank was forclosing on both 
parcels of property. The property was purchased by Defendant Joe 
Martsch, who was a former officer of Raco apd was married to 
Betty Purcel, the current president of Raco,, for an amount of 
approximately 1/8 of the fair market value of the property. 
Blodgetts did not learn that both parcels w0re included in the 
t rus t deed un t i l Martsch asserted his r igh ts of ownership after 
the sale. Blodgetts then sought to set asi#e the t rus t deed and 
subsequent t rus tee f s deed and as part thereof, claimed that 
Martch was in a confidential re la t ionship wlith the Bank and was a 
aware the defect in the t rus t deed. The Utph Supreme Court 
agreed with the Blodgetts and remanded the case set for t r i a l . 
In the instant action, Mrs. Buttars, because of her 
re la t ionship with Mitchell Henderson, is charged with at l eas t 
c o n s t r i c t i v e knowledge t h a t Henderson d id n o t have t i t l e in t h e 
equ ipmen t c l a i m e d by For -Shor and t h a t she cou ld n o t c l a im t i t l e 
t h rough her g r a n d s o n . 
I l l 
THE COURT CANNOT AWARD DAMAGES TO ANY PARTY 
FOR ITEMS WHICH WERE NOT PLEAD BY THAT PARTY 
OR RAISED BY THAT PARTY PRIOR TO TRIAL 
The T r i a l Cour t awarded judgmen t to David Hale in the amount 
of $265.00 a s an o v e r c h a r g e c l a imed by Hale to have been made by 
F o r - S h o r . (See F i n d i n g s of Fac t p a r a g r a p h 11 and Judgment and 
Decree , p a r a g r a p h 4) However, Defendant Hale d id n o t r a i s e t h e 
i s s u e of o v e r c h a r g e d by Fo r -Shor in the C o m p l a i n t . (DCR pp . 1-8, 
and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e p r a y e r of t h e Compla in t , P. 8.) In f a c t , t h e 
o n l y men t ion a t t r i a l of t h e o v e r c h a r g e was b r i e f q u e s t i o n i n g of 
James S n a r r , F o r - S h o r ' s g e n e r a l manager , r e g a r d i n g a c h a r g e to 
Mr. Hale fo r r e t u r n i n g forms d i r t y . (TV I I I , pp . 433-436.) S n a r r 
s t a t e d t h e o v e r c h a r g e t o be $229.52 p l u s t a x , in a t o t a l of 
$ 2 5 2 . 5 8 . (TV I I I , p . 433 1 4 & 5.) Mr. S n a r r a l s o t e s t i f i e d 
t h a t t h e r e was an o u t s t a n d i n g and unpaid b a l a n c e on David H a l e ' s 
a c c o u n t of $237.77, e x c l u s i v e of i n t e r e s t from March of 1982. (TV 
I I I , p . 444 1. 4 - 5.) Al though t h i s amount was a l s o no t p l e a d 
by F o r - S h o r , i t would be a d e q u a t e to o f f - s e t any e r r o r fo r 
o v e r c h a r g e s by For -Shor and i t i s c l e a r t h a t Hale has no t pa id 
the o v e r c h a r g e . 
In t h e c a s e o f C o r n i a v^ C o r n i a U t a h , 546 P. 2d 890 (1 9 7 6 ) , 
t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t even though the Rules of P r o c e e d u r e 
p r o v i d e fo r l i b e r a l i t y in g r a n t i n g of r e l i e f fo r which t h e 
evidence shows a party is en t i t l ed , such l ibetfal i ty does not go 
so far as to authorize the granting of r e l i e f on issues nei ther 
raised nor t r ied . In Cornia, Mrs. Cornia's sc(ns f i led an 
application and pe t i t ion of incompetency to appoint a gaurdian. 
The complaint deal t only with the issue of her capacity and 
prayed only for the appointment of a gaurdian of her e s t a t e . 
During the t r i a l , issues were raised regarding the va l id i ty of a 
wi l l and t rus t deed Mrs. Cornia had executed. The t r i a l court 
set aside the wi l l and t rus t deed. The Supreme Court reversed 
the t r i a l court 's decision ruling in effect that since the issues 
regarding the v a l i d i t y of the w i l l and t r u s t deed had not been 
raised, the court could not grant ref ief for those claims. 
In the instant action, P la in t i f f Hale dlid not plead nor 
request r e l i e f for the overcharge. In fact, as stated in the 
f i r s t full paragraph on page 6 of P l a in t i f f ' s Trial Brief (DCR p. 
320), P la in t i f f s 1 counsel stated that the chapges were f i r s t 
noticed in preparation for t r i a l . In addition, as the testimony 
clear ly showed, Hale has not paid the overcharge since his 
account s t i l l shows a balance owing in the approximate amount of 
the overcharge. Hale should not have been granted Judgment on the 
amount claimed to be overcharged by For Shor since the matter was 




THE CLAIM FOR LOSS OF PROFITS AND RENTALS IS TOTALLY 
SPECULATIVE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED 
The T r i a l Cour t awarded damages to Mrs. B u t t a r s for t h e l o s 
o f r e n t a l v a l u e o f t h e f o r m s t h a t w e r e t a k e n f o r a p e r i o d of 
t h r e e y e a r s , o r from J u l y 9, 1981 to J u l y 1984. The Memorandum 
D e c i s i o n s t a t e d t h a t damages were d e t e r m i n e d as f o l l o w s : 
A f u l l s e t b e i n g of t h e r e n t a l v a l u e of abou t $5,000.00 
p e r y e a r , bu t t h e r e b e i n g o n l y t aken a h a l f s e t the c o u r t 
w i l l award $ 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 damages per yea r for t h e t h r e e y e a r s 
o r $ 7 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 . (DCR p . 407) 
In r e v i e w i n g the t r a n s c r i p t , Defendant was u n a b l e to l o c a t e 
any e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h i n g the annua l r e n t a l v a l u e for a f u l l s e t 
o f forms a t $5 ,000.00 , o r a t any v a l u e . In a t t e m p t i n g to 
e s t a b l i s h damages fo r l o s s of r e n t a l s , P l a i n t i f f s o f f e r e d 
t e s t i m o n y of P l a i n t i f f M i t c h e l l Henderson s t a t i n g t h a t the t o t a l 
r e n t a l s for t he t h r e e months be tween A p r i l , 1981 and J u l y , 1981 
w e r e " . . . a r o u n d $ 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 , I b e l e i v e , " (TV I , p . 34, 1. 15) 
T h i s b r i e f t h r e e m o n t h s i s t h e o n l y p e r i o d o f t i m e from 1 9 7 8 , 
when the forms were a l l e g e d l y s o l d to I l e e n B u t t a r s , u n t i l the 
forms were r e p o s s e s s e d by For -Shor in J u l y 1981 , t h a t t h e r e was 
any t e s t i m o n y of a c t u a l r e n t a l s . In o t h e r w o r d s , P l a i n t i f f s 
a t t e m p t e d to prove annua l r e n t a l s based on a s h o r t t h r e e month 
p e r i o d d u r i n g the e n t i r e t h r e e y e a r s p r i o r to the r e p o s s e s s i o n . 
In a d d i t i o n , P l a i n t i f f s had a p p r o x i m a t e l y two and one h a l f 
s e t s o f f o r m s a v a i l a b l e to r e n t , one s e t o f w a l l m a s t e r f o r m s an 
one s e t of Mod-u-form forms o r i g i n a l l y p u r c h a s e d from I n t e r s t a t e 
I n d u s t r i e s , and the h a l f s e t of Mod-u-form forms r e n t e d and l a t e 
p u r c h a s e d from For Shor . 
P l a i n t i f f s a l so offered T r i a l Exhib i t s 9, 10, and 13 in an 
a t tempt to e s t a b l i s h a r e n t a l va lue . Exhibi t No. 9 i s a 
Iff David Hale; 
; and Exhibi t 13 i s 
handwri t ten memorandum of r e n t a l s to P l a i n t i 
Exhibi t 10 i s some r e n t a l s in a r e c e i p t book): 
copies of checks to Mitch Henderson from Han|senfs Cow Palace 
Dairy. In reviewing the Exh ib i t s , some of whtlch are d u p l i c a t i o n s 
( the i t e m s in E x h i b i t 9 and some of the checks l i s t e d in E x h i b i t 
13 are a lso included in the r e c e i p t book, Exlhibit 10. (See TV 1 
T)V>. 55, 56 , ) , t he t o t a l r e n t a l s a r e on ly $2 ,034.55 . However, no 
e x a c t f i g u r e was ever t e s t i f i e d to a t t r i a l pr p r e s e n t e d a t 
t r i a l . 
In o r d e r fo r the c o u r t to award damage$ to P l a i n t i f f s for 
l o s t p r o f i t s , t he r e must be tes t imony supported by competent 
proof upon which reasonable minds ac t ing f a i r l y thereon could 
be l i eve t h a t i t i s more probable than not t|hat the damages were 
a c t u a l l y suf fered . In Jamison v Utah Home F i re I n s . Co., Utah, 
559 P.2d 958 (1977), the genera l r u l e i s s t a t ed t h a t "an award 
of damages cannot p roper ly be made on mere p o s s i b l i t y or 
con jec tu re , t he re must be a f i rmer foundation." 559 P.2d a t 961. 
This cour t s t a t ed in Highland Cons t ruc t ion [Co. v. Union P a c i f i c 
Rai l road Co., Utah, 683 P.2d 1042 (1984), tljiat although some 
degree of u n c e r t a i n t y in the evidence of damages w i l l not r e l i e v e 
a Defendant from recompensing a wronged Plaj int iff , the long 
s tanding general r u l e i s t h a t a P l a i n t i f f "Imust show damages by 
evidence of f ac t s and not by mere conclus ions and tha t the i tems 
of damage must be e s t ab l i shed by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence and not by 
con jec tu re . " 683 P.2d a t 1045. A s i m i l a r s ta tement i s contained 
in Acculog I n c . v P e t e r s o n , Utah, 6 92 P. 2d 72 8 (1 984) , to the 
e f f ec t t h a t l o s t p r o f i t s may be recovered only when the evidence 
submitted provides a b a s i s for e s t ima t ing them with reasonable 
c e r t a i n t y . 
A case dealing specifically with damges for lost profits in 
Utah is Howarth v^ Ostergaard, 515 P.2d at 442, 30 Utah 2d 183 
(1973). Therein, the plaintiffs, who were in the nursery and 
floral business, claimed that the defendants had wrongfully 
recorded a mortgage on a home purchased by plaintiffs from 
defendants, which prevented the plaintiffs from obtaining a bank 
loan. Tt was further claimed that the inability to obtain a bank 
loan prevented the plaintiffs from financing the sale of 
Christmas trees, which was an annual venture. The trial court 
found the claim for lost profits in the Christmas tree venture, 
even though the sales had been continuing annually for some time, 
were too speculative .to be considered. In affirming the trial 
court, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The problem as to when and under what circumstances damages 
may be recovered for loss in operating a business is, as is 
true in so many controversial areas of the law, a coin that 
has at least two sides to it. The basic and general rule is 
that loss of anticipated profits of a business venture 
involve so many factors of uncertainty that ordinarily 
profits to be realized in the future are too speculative to 
base an award of damages thereon. The other side of the 
coin is that damages to a business or enterprise need only 
be proved with sufficient certainty that reasonable minds 
might believe from a preponderance of the evidence that 
damages were actually suffered. 
We note our awarness of the evidence that the plaintiffs had 
been engaged in the floral, nursery and Christmas tree 
business for some time. Nevertheless, with respect to 
this particular venture, as to the bidding on the trees and 
the projected enterprise, we do not disagree with the trial 
court's statement upon which the waiver of the jury by the 
plaintiffs was predicated. 515 P.2d 445 
[See also 22 Am. Jur . 2d, p. 243; Jenkins v Morgan, 123 
Utah 480, 260 P. 532; Van Zyverden v. Fa"rrar, 15 Utah 2d 
367, 393 P.2d 468, cited as authori ty jn Howarth.] 
In the instant action, the damages claimed for loss of 
r en ta l s is too speculative for the court to have awarded damages. 
Mrs. Buttars had allegedly owned the two ancfl one-half sets of 
forms for th ree yea r s , but out of the th ree years she had owned 
the forms had only rented them for approxim^tly three months 
during the period from April 1981 to July 1|981. No evidence was 
presented showing the market for P la in t i f f 'g business, nor the 
requ la r i ty of business ac t iv i ty , nor expenses or operating costs 
of such business, or P la in t i f f ' s a b i l i t y to rent the forms. 
P la in t i f f s did not even offer testimony as to the exact amount 
received for the ren ta l s but stated that i t was " around 
$2,500.00". When P la in t i f f ' s Attorney attempted to introduce 
testimony at t r i a l to es tabl i sh renta ls for the remainder of 1981 
based on r e n t a l s for the th ree months from April to July of 1 981 , 
Defendants Attorney objected on the grounds that such testimony 
was too speculative and the objection was $ustained by the t r i a l 
cour t . (TVI, p 37, 1 . 1 1 - 1 9 ) (See fur thef argument by the 
a t to rneys to the cou r t , TVI, p 37, 1. 20 - p 39, 1. 11) 
P la in t i f f s thereaf ter did not introduce evidence regarding future 
r e n t a l s . 
To project los t prof i t s without credible foundation over a 
three year period based solely on speculation and conjecture and 
based on a br ief three month his tory is sitnply too indefinate and 
speculative to allow an award of damages. The damages of 
$2,500.00 a year for loss of ren ta l s for three years, as awarded 
by the t r i a l court even after the t r i a l court sustained 
D e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n s and r e f u s e d to a l l o w t e s t i m o n y on f u t u r e 
r e n t a l s , s h o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , be r e v e r s e d , 
V 
PLAINTIFFS OFFERED NO EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
THE VALUE OF THE FORMS REPOSSESSED BY FOR-SHOR 
AT THE TIME OF THE REPOSSESSION AND NO VALUE 
SHOULD BE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF FOR THE FORMS 
S i m i l a r in n a t u r e to e s t a b l i s h i n g damages fo r l o s t p r o f i t s 
a r e the r e q u i r e m e n t s to e s t a b l i s h v a l u e fo r damages to p r o p e r t y . 
As s t a t e d i n B u n n e l l v B i l l s , 368 P.2d 597 , 1 3 Utah 2d 83 (1 9 6 2 ) : 
Where a r u l e of law h a s been e s t a b l i s h e d fo r the measurement 
o f d a m a g e s , i t m u s t be f o l l o w e d by t h e 
f i n d e r of f a c t , and to r e c o v e r damages, P l a i n t i f f 
must p rove n o t o n l y t h a t she has s u f f e r e d a l o s s , 
bu t must a l s o p rove the e x t e n t and the amount 
t h e r e o f . F u r t h e r m o r e , to w a r r a n t a r e c o v e r y based on 
t h e v a l u e of t he p r o p e r t y t h e r e must be p roof of i t s 
v a l u e and e v i d e n c e of such f a c t s as w i l l w a r r a n t a f i n d i n g 
of v a l u e wi th r e a s o n a b l e c e r t a i n t y . 
In t h a t c a s e , Defendant B i l l s had pu rchased t h e A l t a Motor 
Lodge from Erv in S t e v e n s on a Uniform Real E s t a t e C o n t r a c t and 
t h e n r e s o l d t h e A l t a Moto r Lodge to t h e p l a i n t i f f by s i g n i n g an 
E a r n e s t Money R e c e i p t and Offer to P u r c h a s e . When d e f e n d a n t 
B i l l s l e a r n e d t h a t he would be unab le to c o m p l e t e h i s c o n t r a c t 
w i t h S t e v e n s , t h e y m u t u a l l y t e r m i n a t e d the Uniform Real E s t a t e 
C o n t r a c t . S t e v e n s then r e s o l d t h e m o t e l to a n o t h e r p a r t y in 
c o n t r a v e n t i o n of t h e i n t e r e s t p l a i n t i f f c l a i m e d in the p r o p e r t y . 
At t r i a l , p l a i n t i f f e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t he r ag reemen t to p u r c h a s e 
t h e m o t e l was fo r the p u r c h a s e p r i c e of $175,000.00 and t h a t the 
s u b s e q u e n t s a l e to t h e t h i r d p a r t y was fo r $180,000.00. The 
t r i a l court awarded damages of $5,000.00 fort the value of the 
proper ty of the d i f f e r ence between the two purchase p r i c e s . The 
Supreme Court reversed on the issue of damages s t a t i n g tha t the 
value of the p roper ty had not been adequat l^ e s t a b l i s h e d and t h a t 
the purchase agreements were not n e c e s s a r i l y d e f i n i t i v e or 
s u f f i c e n t to e s t a b l i s h the va lue of p roper ty . 
In the case a t bar , the t r a n s c r i p t of the t r i a l is e n t i r e l y 
void of evidence or tes t imony to e s t a b l i s h the va lue of the forms 
repossessed by For Shor. In ques t ioning Ja|mes Snarr , For Shor fs 
genera l manager, P l a i n t i f f s a t tempted to e s t a b l i s h a 1984 value 
of the forms based on a percentage increase from 1982 p r i c e s . 
(See TVII pp. 260-262.) In r e f e r r i n g to thte t h i r d page of T r i a l 
Exhib i t No. 28, P l a i n t i f f ' s Attorney asked Mr. Snarr if the 1982 
p r i ce for forms was shown on the Exhibi t upder the column heading 
"New Pr ice . " The tes t imony i s as follows ^beginning p. 261, 1-
20): 
Q Let me see i t . Ok, would you s|how where the 1982 p r i c e 
i s on tha t t h i r d page? Show i t to the c o u r t . 
A The 1 982 p r i c e i s shown in th0 column n e x t under new 
p r i c e . Right h e r e . 
Q That was 1 982. And how much ojf an i n c r e a s e has t h e r e 
been s ince 1982 on those same forms? 
A Approximatly • today? 
Q Yes. 
A To the present? 
Q uh-huh. 
A Somewhere between seven and t e n p e r c e n t . 
Q And tha t went up in January tof 1984; i s t ha t 
c o r r e c t , 
A I t a c t u a l l y went up in October of f73 [ s i c ] . We 
could not receive no t i f i ca t ion un t i l February of f84. 
Q So if you were to give todays p r i ce s for t ha t same 
equipment i t would be 7% to 1 0% higher than is on t h i s o ther 
exhibit 26; i s that correct? 
A On page 3? 
0 Page 3, Yes. 
A Yes. 
I t should be noted that Defendant objected to the admission 
of Trial Exhibit No. 28 (which is the or ig ina l of Exhibit 26) on 
the basis that Exhibit 28 was prepared in preparation for t r i a l , 
and in an a t tempt to s e t t l e the ac t ion and was not admiss ib le for 
any purpose. Defendant also objected as to any relevance of 
Exhibits 26 and 28. (TV II pp. 251-253) The Trial Court accepted 
the documents under Rule 803 (6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence as 
a business record, but qualified i t with "I can't in terpre t i t , 
but - - - ". (TV II p . 253, 1. 11-13). 
Defendant is unable to find any other evidence in the record 
where P la in t i f f s offered testimony to es tabl ish the value of the 
forms. Even when questioning Mr. Snarr, P l a in t i f f s did not ask 
him to s ta te a value of the forms. The only value ever given for 
the forms i s in P la in t i f f s Trial Brief prepared af ter t r i a l to 
present certain facts and rules of law of the t r i a l court. At 
page 7 of Defendant's Trial Brief, (DCR pp. 315-335, spec i f ica l ly 
paze 321), P la in t i f f refers to Exhibit 27 and to Ehxibit 28. 
Exhibit 27 is the repossession t icket used by For-Shor to 
indicate what items had been repossessed and Exhibit 28 is the 
sett lement document prepared by Mr. Snarr. P la in t i f f s s ta te in 
the f i r s t full paragraph of that page (DCR P. 321) that Mr. Snarr 
had inspected the remainder of the forms at Mrs. Henderson's 
property Clarkston and late 1983 and had statfed that those 
par t icu lar forms had a value of 76% of new. Defendant is unable 
to loca te any t e s t i tmony to tha t e f f ec t to e s t a b l i s h a used value 
based on a percentage of the price for new fdrms. P la in t i f f s 
then itemized what forms had been repossessed, increased the 
p r i ce from 1 982 p r i ce taken from Exhibi t s 27 and 28 to a 1 984 
p r i ce to e s t a b l i s h a t o t a l value if the forms had been new and 
then m u l t i p l i e d t h a t t o t a l by 76% to come tq a value of 
$5,725.35. 
Plaintiffs 'method of establ ishing the v|alue of the forms is 
based merely on the conclusions of P la in t i f f s and thei r attorney 
and is not established by substant ia l evidence as required by 
law. See Highland Construction Co. vs. Unipn Pacif ic , supra. At 
no time was Mr. Snarr asked to e s t a b l i s h a \^alue of the forms 
which had been actual ly repossessed nor was any other testimony 
presented to e s t a b l i s h the value of the fortns t h a t had been 
repossessed. Furthermore, Exhibits 27 and $8 were not offered by 
P la in t i f f for the purpose of establ ishing the value of the forms 
and were not accepted by the court for that purpose. P la in t i f f s 
have merely attempted to conjecturally extract the value of the 
forms from br ief testimony which was not g^ven with the intent to 
es tabl ish the value of the forms except foif priviledged purposes 
of settlement and from the documents which were not offered or 
accepted to es tabl ish the value of the forijns. 
Where there is no substant ia l evidence upon which reasonable 
minds could e s t a b l i s h a value for damages^ or as in the i n s t a n t 
action, any evidence at a l l to es tabl ish the value of the 
p r o p e r t y in q u e s t i o n , no d a m a g e s can be a w a r d e d f o r t h e v a l u e o f 
t h e equ ipmen t a s c l a imed by P l a i n t i f f s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s a w a r d of d a m a g e s f o r t h e v a l u e o f t h e f o r m s in t h e amoun t 
o f $5,725.35 must be r e v e r s e d . 
VI 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ESTABLISH ANY DAMAGES CAUSED BY 
ANY ALLEGED TRESPASS ON LAURENA HENDERSONS PROPERTY 
Even assuming t h a t Defendant t r e s p a s s e d on Laurena 
Henderson ' s p r o p e r t y , which Defendant d e n i e s , P l a i n t i f f s have 
o f f e r e d no e v i d e n c e to e s t a b l i s h damages caused by t h e t r e s p a s s . 
When q u e s t i o n e d about t h e damage to he r p r o p e r t y caused by 
D e f e n d a n t s , (TVI pp . 100-101) Laurena Henderson t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
De fendan t ' s employees made i n d e n t a t i o n s w i t h a heavy t r u c k t h a t 
"mashed the g r a s s down i n t o the s o i l . " She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y 
t r a v e l e d a p p r o x i m a t l y 90 f e e t by h e r m e a s u r e m e n t s , which were 
made by s t e p p i n g of f t h e d i s t a n c e , a s D e f e n d a n t ' s employees 
a l l e g e d l y t r a v e l e d a c r o s s h e r lawn, ( see l i n e s 8-19 , p . 100) 
When asked aga in what he r damages w e r e , Mrs. Henderson s t a t e d 
t h a t h e r lawn was "mashed down", ( see l i n e 15, p.101) Mrs. 
Henderson d id n o t s t a t e a v a l u e fo r damages c l a i m e d by h e r . In 
f a c t , in c r o s s e x a m i n a t i o n , Mrs. Henderson aga in t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
t h e damages were "not enough to wor ry a b o u t " . (TVI p . 106, 1. 
18-24) 
Wi thout e s t a b l i s h i n g a v a l u e fo r damages caused by t h e 
t r e s p a s s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t cou ld o n l y award n o m i n a l damages of 
$1.00, even upon a f i n d i n g t h a t Defendant had t r e s p a s s e d on Mrs. 
Henderson ' s p r o p e r t y . (See 75 AmJur 2d T r e s s p a s s , S e c t i o n 49 ; 
Haase v^ Helgeson, 360 P.2d 339 [Wash. 1961]) (Also see Pehrson 
v^ Saderup, 498 P2d 648, 28 Utah 2d 77 (1972) for measuring 
trespass damages generally.) 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs1 action was without merit. Defendant, For-Shor 
Company, repossessed only the property that lawfully belonged to 
it, both under theories of title retention apd contract. 
Plaintiffs1 claim of payment under promissory note is invalid 
because the promissory note was entered into upon Mr. Henderson's 
own misrepresentation. It would be both unjust and inequitable 
to allow Mr. Henderson or his grandmother to benefit from his 
misrepresentation and fraud. Furthermore, ttie evidence is clear 
that Mrs. Buttars only purchased the property, which was pledged 
to First Security Bank. There is no dispute between the 
parties, that the property at issue in this cjase was never 
pledged as collateral to First Security. Con$equently, it was not 
sold to Mrs. Buttars. It is abundantly cleat that the parties 
neither intended, nor lawfully could have transferred the For-
Shor cement forms to Mrs. Buttars. Therefore, no award of 
damages can be assessed for Defendant rightfully taking action to 
repossess. 
However, even if Plaintiffs had proven wrongful 
repossession, no evidence supports an award of damages. 
Plaintiffs have failed to prove with any reasonable degree of 
certainty that a profit for there rental business was a future 
reality, let alone that there was any loss c^f such profit over 
the three year period from the date of repossession until 
j u d g m e n t . N e i t h e r d id the P l a i n t i f f s , whose burden i t was , p rove 
v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y which was a c t u a l l y r e p o s s e s s e d . Defendant 
r e p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t s t h a t the T r i a l Cour t e r r e d in a s s e s s i n g 
damages f o r l o s t p r o f i t s and c o n v e r s i o n of p r o p e r t y . The meaning 
of such damage canno t be based upon mere s p e c u l a t i o n . 
F i n a l l y a s to t h e c l a i m s of David Ha le and L a u r e n a 
Henderson , P l a i n t i f f H a l e ' s award of damages i s s i m p l y 
u n s u p p o r t e d e i t h e r by t h e e v i d e n c e o r in law s i n c e t he same was 
n e i t h e r p l e a d nor e v i d e n c e d . Mrs. Hender son ' s award of damages 
for t r e s p a s s i s no t s u p p o r t e d by any e v i d e n c e and aga in s u g g e s t s 
t h e e r r o r and a p p a r a n t b i a s of t h e T r i a l Cour t in i t s 1 d e c i s i o n . 
A c o m p l e t e r e v i e w of t h e ev idence p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l 
s u g g e s t s o n l y one c o n c l u s i o n : Defendant a c t e d in a no rma l and 
r e a s o n a b l e b u s i n e s s manner in r e p o s s e s s i n g p r o p e r t y r i g h t f u l l y 
b e l o n g i n g to i t . P l a i n t i f f s r c o n t e n t i o n r e m a i n s u n s u p p o r t e d . 
D e f e n d a n t / A p p e a l a n t s r e s p e c t f u l l y , t h e r e f o r e , r e q u e s t t h e Cour t 
t o s e t a s i d e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e C o u r t in i t s e n t i r e t y and award 
c o s t s of t r i a l and a p p e a l to A p p e l l a n t s . R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d 
t h i s 25th day of J u l y , 1985. 
JAMES C. JENKINS & ASSOCIATES 
Q4.J-
James C. J e n k i 
ADDENDUM 
Attached here to for the Court fs cons ide ra t ion are copies of 
the fol lowing document and excerpts from the D i s t r i c t Court record 
and t r a n s c r i p t : 
Memorandum Decision 
Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law 
Judgment and Decree 
T r i a l Exhibi t No. 3 - - Sta tement , For-Shor Co. 
T r i a l Exhibi t No. 4 - - Invoice (with r eve r se s ide added) 
T r i a l Exhibi t No. 5 - - Cred i t Memo 
T r i a l Exhibi t No. 17 - - Account Agreement 
T r i a l Exhibi t No. 27 - - Return Document 
T r i a l Exhibi t No. 28 - - L i s t of Forms ([original) 
T r i a l Esh ib i t No. 37 - - Promissory Note and For-Shor Statements 
Page 7 of P l a i n t i f f f s T r i a l Brief TVII pp. 261-262 
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